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PARENTAL RIGHTS V. BEST
INTEREST: A W AR BETWEE N
PARENTS AND G RANDPARE NTS
MATT C HRISTENSEN
Th~ U.S. Suprnn~ Court's tkcision in Trox~l v. GranviU~

a propnvalidation oftlu constiNttional guaranu~ ofparental rights; individual
states need to reevaluate their staNJUs to mmre the parental rights
delinteated in the 14th Amendment.

T

WitS

ommie GranviUe and Brad Troxel Lived together in the state of
Washington until 1991. Although never married, at the time
of separation they had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie.
After the separation, Brad resumed living with his parents and often had
his daughters over for the weekend with their paternal grandparents. In
May of 1993, Brad committed suicide. Brad's parents, rhe Troxels,
continued to see Isabelle and Natalie until October of 1993. At this
time, Tommie informed the grandparents that she wished to limit the
visitation to one visit per month. The Troxels brought a case in court
based on a Washington state statute allowing "any person [to] petition
the court for visitation rights at any time. "1 They requested visitation
two weekends a month and two weeks during the summer. Tommie
wanted to allow only one day of visitation per month, with no summer
stay. The case finally reached the Washington Supreme Court, who
ruled in favor ofTommie, stating that the state statute wa.~ unconstitutional. The Troxels brought the case before the U.S. Supreme Court in
January of 2000; the court ruled last June. The U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the Washington Supreme Court's decision that the statute was
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unconstitutional, supporting Tommie in her choices for raising her
children.
In Troxel v. Granville, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the
parental rights standard to rule the Washington State statute unconstitutional. The parental rights standard, by which parents are allowed to
make decisions regarding their children, is one of two standards used
by the Supreme Court in deciding visitation rights. The other standard
is the best interest standard, which considers the children's best interest.
These standards can be synonymous or mutually exclusive. When these
standards are not in harmony, the best interest standard is preferred
only if parents are unfit to raise their children. However, when the
parents are fit to raise their children, the best interest standard
is unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Troxel
v. Granville was a proper validation of the constitutional guarantee
of parental rights; therefore, individual states need to reevaluate
their statutes to ensure the parental rights delineated in the 14th
Amendment.
Best Interest Standard
When courts use the best interest standard, it is usually to go
against something the parents have wished because "by the very nature
of this 'best interest of the child' doctrine, custody decisions are not
made from the parents' perspective but rather the child's."2 This is one
of the main arguments against using this standard. Essentially the best
interest standard gives the courts, rather than parents, power to make
family decisions such as visitation rights.
Courts award visitation rights based on the best interest standard
according to three different justifications. The first.justification concerns the obligations of the courts to protect the children in its jurisdiction. This obligation is rooted in the state's parens patriae power
designed to help state citizens that need special protection. This group
usually includes racial minorities, gender minorities, and minor
children. Thus, the state has an obligation to ensure that children in the
state are provided for.
A Pennsylvania court utilized the parens patriae power in a concurring opinion for a 1995 case, Rowles v. Rowles. Leading up to the
court proceedings, the parents moved in with the children's grandparents.
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Two months after the birth of the second child, the parents moved our,
leaving the children behind. They were having marital problems and did
nor want to subject the children to unneeded contention. A year and a
half later the parents divorced. The divorce proceedings involved granting
legal guardianship of the two children to their grandparents. But six
months later, the mother petitioned for custody of her children. The
court questioned the "prima facie presumption chat parems have a right
co custody of their children as against third parties."~ The Pennsylvania
court argued that sometimes a biological relationship does not guarantee
rhe best care possible for the child, and the court "should not be

restrained solely by [this] presumption."4 Unfortunately, this court's
decision does not emphasize the right that only parentS, not third parties,
have according ro the Constitution.
Courts also use the parms patriae power to justify awarding
custody or visitation to a third parry who can better provide for the
children. In the Troxel case, the first Washington State court found that
the Troxels could "provide opportunities for the children in the areas of
cousins and music and the children would be benefited &om spending
quality time with the [Troxels]." ~ However, the Washington Stare
Supreme Court, and subsequendy the U.S. Supreme Court, overruled
chis lower court. In irs ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court states: "The
Due Process Clause [in the Constitution] does not permit a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child-rearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a ' better' decision could
be made." 6 In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court pronounced that
because someone else can better care for a child, or because someone
else can provide differently for a child, is not a good enough reason for
taking that child away from his or her parentS.
The second way to justify implementing the best interest standard
concerns the fitness of the parent. A stare may have a right to intervene
and award visitation or custody to a third parry if rhe third party can
prove that a parent is unfit; however, proving that a parent is unfit is
very difficult.
In a 1921 Minnesota case, the state Supreme Court laid out the
requirements of proving unfitness. In this case, Ruth Platzer signed
an agreement consem.ing to the adoption of her baby girls by R. W.
Beardsley. On May 23, the Beardsleys filed a petition to adopt the
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child. Ruth appeared and revoked her consent to the adoption, stating
that she wanted the child back. The Beardsley's arguments co Ruth
were based on two things: the agreement she had signed and their belief
that they could take better care of the child. Based on past state court
precedent, the court dismissed the Beardsley's first argument about the
agreement, seating that the agreement "created no binding obligations
respecting the custody of the child."- The court then rurned to the
Beardsley's second argument, their claim that they could better care for
the child rhan the child's morher. In deciding the case, the Minnesota
Supreme Courr dispelled assumptions about unfitness:
The cies by which mother and child are bound together should nor
be severed except for grave and weigbry reasons.... The mere fact
that a mother is so destitute or impoverished char she cannot
adequately provide for the needs of her child and that someone else is
willing to rake it and give it better educational and material
advamages does nor justifY rhe court in transferring its custody.*
ln a 1925 custody case, the same state coun stated: "The naruraJ
parents have the first right to the care and cusrody of the child .... Mere
poverty of the parents is seldom, if ever, a sufficient ground for depriving
them of the natural right of the custody of their child.'"1 In both of these
cases, custody of the child was awarded to the narural parents.
The third jUSTification some courts use to support the best interest
standard is the harm done to children when deprived of rheir relationship with their grandparents or a third parry. Psychologists, behavioral
scientists, and legislators argue chat children benefit from the intergenerational relations children have with their grandparents. The
problem with this argument is that "little empirical data is available to
assess the merits of grandparent visitation. "•• Family law practitioner,
David Walther states: "Courts and legislators are making a tenuous leap
of logic in finding court-ordered grandparent visitation is in rhe best
interest of the grandchildren . . . . We are left with only anecdotal
evidence and presumptions about whether court-ordered grandparent
visitation is in a child's best interests. " 11 Because of the lack of srudies
to conclusively prove that court-ordered grandparent visitation helps
the relations and emotional well-being of the children involved, the
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argument that these relationships are beneficial cannot be used to take
rights away from parents.
Despite the lack of studies done on court-ordered grandparent
child visitation, the best interest standard can and sometimes should be
used when harm to a child is proven. The grandparents must prove that
allowing visitation will remedy the harm caused; however, rhe courts
have turned this argument around, assuming from the beginning that
visitation is in the best interest of the child. This wrongly leaves the
burden of proof on the parents. In her opinion of the Troxel v. Granville case, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor referred to this change. She
explained, "In effect, [the Washington Supreme Court] placed on
Granville the burden of disproving that visitation would be in her
daughters' best interest and thus failed to provide any protection of
her fundamental right. "'l If courts place the burden of proof on
parents, they are disrupting parents' fundamental rights. Associate
Professor of Law Laurence Nolan believes, "The courts have lost sight
of the fact that it is the parent who has a right to uninterrupted
custody. "'3 It is the grandparents upon whom the burden of proof
should lie, not the parents.
As we see from the three justifications previously mentioned, only
if the unfitness of parents can be proved should the rights of the
parents be overturned and the best interest standard used. In all other
cases the court would have a hard time justifying its relevance on rhe
best interest standard. The best interest standard does not have any set
qualitative measures by which to judge. It is an unfair balancing test
between two parties. Each party gives irs reasons for the best interest of
the children and the party with the best reasons usually wins. The
problem with having a balancing test is judges are forced ro rule solely
by opinion because there are no guidelines on which to base their
ruling. In the Troxel case, the first judge ruled completely differently
than the second and subsequent judges. If judges have no qualirative
measures in making their decisions, then they are free to make
whatever decision they feel would be right. This results in widely
differing opinions on the same issues, which only serves to compound
the problem. On the other hand, the parental rights standard is not a
balancing test that relies solely on a judge. It does have some qualitative
and constitucional measures a judge can use in determining visitation.

40/ BYU Prelaw Review
This leads to less confusion, and serves to help solve the problem,
instead of compounding it.

Parental Rights Standard
Originally, grandparenrs and others had no legal basis for
requesting visitation. Parents allowed visitation based on a moral
obligation, rather than a legal one. Early courts normally did not
intervene in this area, believing that if they were to do so, it would just:
worsen relations between the parents and grandparents. H The firsc case
the Supreme Court used in deciding these issues and describing a
parental right justification was Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923. In this case,
Nebraska had a law forbidding the teaching of foreign languages in
school to anyone \vho had not passed the eighth grade. Meyer was
a reacher in a public school who was charged with teaching German
to a ten-year-old child. In its ruling, the Court stated that parents had
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution to raise their
children as they saw fit. The Court held chat rhe state statute not to
reach foreign language in the schools was a violation of liberty
protected by the 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment protects the
right to "engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, co marry, establish a home and bring up children. "15
In many other cases the Supreme Court upholds consticurional rights
of parents to raise their children as they see 6t. 16
Another recent example of che parental rights standard taking
priority over the best interest standard is the Elian Gonzalez situation
of last year. Elian and his mother escaped Cuba without his father
knowing. Elian's mother subsequently died en route to the U.S. Elian's
father requested his son's return. The extended family in the United
States wanted him to stay in the U.S. They argued that he would have a
better life here and better chances in the future. The U.S. Justice
Department might have used the court precedenr in visitation standards
to justify their actions in sending him back and upholding his
biological father's wishes. Elian's father traveled to the United States
and the Justice Department rerurned Elian to his facher in Cuba against
his relatives' wishes. Although the child, according to his relatives in the
U.S., may have had more opportunities in the Unired States, the wishes
of his father were upheld.
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The parental rights standard has a strong constitutional background. When the U.S. Supreme Court decides on any statures that
may violate a constitutional right, in this case parental rights, the court
applies the test of strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is tbe highest of three
rests the Supreme Court uses in making rulings. If a case is based on
rights deftned in the Constitution, the strict scrutiny test requires that
rbe srate must have a solid reason for raking away chat right. In
applying this test, the Court must look at the state's justification for

overruling che 14th Amendmem liberty interest of the parents. If the
state's justification is not a compelling state interest, one that the state
can prove is required for the well-being of its citizens, then the Court
will declare the statute unconstitutional. & shown before, there is only
one valid justification for a state to overrule parental rights-when a
parent is proven unfit. Indeed, in the Troxel case the Supreme Coun
states:
So long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into
the private realm of the family ro further question the abiJjry of that
parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children.,-

However, many states do not currently use this standard in their
statutes. Even though this standard has the strongest court backing and
constitutional protection, the states still base their statutes on the best
interest standard. The current Utah Jaw on visitation is a good example
of such a state statute.
The Utah statute lists five reasons why the court may override a
parent's decision and allow grandparent visitation: (1) it is in che best
interest of the grandchild, (2) the petitioner is a fit and proper person
to have rights of visitation with the grandchild, (3) the petitioner has
repeatedly attempted to visit the grandcbiJd and has not been allowed
to visit the grandchild as a direct result of the actions of the parent or
parents, (4) there is no ocher way for the petitioner to visit the grandchild without court intervention, and (5) the petitioner has rebutted
the presumption that the parents' decision to refuse or limit visitation
with the grandchild was reasonable. 18 After looking ar these reasons, we
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see that numbers three, four, and five all are dependent on proving
number one. As shown before, the grandparents must prove that rhe
visitation is in the best interest of the child. If that cannot be proven,
then the only reason for visitation that remains, under the Utah law, is
the unfitness of rhe parents.
The Utal1 statute does nor differ much from other scares. If the
parental rights standard is the standard with the strongest constitutional
backing, why do the stares have statutes like Utah's that support the best
inrerest standard? Many legislatures do not seem to fully understand
the best interest doctrine. The scare legislators are doing what they think
and feel is right based on the grandparenrs' perspective; yet ir seems as if
the legislatures do not fully understand the legal and constitutional
issues involved in disregarding parents' rights to raise their children as
they see fie.
Validation for the Supreme Court's Ruling
Which standard is better? Many would argue that the parenral
rights standard incorporates the best interest standard because parents
are going to do what is in the best interest of their children. While this is
often true, if a court intervenes to grant visitation ro a parry whom the
parents do nor want their child co see, then that court is undermining
the parent's power co act in their child's best interest. The requirements
of the best interest standard dictate chat a petitioner muse have been
deprived of visitation in one form or another-otherwise they would
nor be petitioning for visitation. This means that if the court has used
the best interest standard to award visitation ro grandparents, it muse be
because the parents did not want their child to visit his or her grandparents. The court, by awarding visitation, is then interpreting the best
interest of the children differently than do rhe parents of the child.
Thus, the parental rights standard is in direct conflict with the best
interest standard-the two cannot exist ar the same rinle. Parents can act
in the best interest of their children; however, when the court deliberates
on a case using the best interest srandard, it cannot be using the parental
rights standard at the same time. The simple fact that the best interest
standard is used means the court is going against what parents wish for
their children, thereby discarding the parents' rights, and subsequently
the standard connected with them. In Troxel v. Granville, however, the
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Supreme Court validated the constitutional guarantee of parental rights
and upheld the parental rights standard.
The parental rights standard has strong constitutional backing. The
best interest standard does not. The courts have specifically found a
fundamental right of parents to raise their children. Nowhere has a
fundamental right of grandparents to visit their grandchildren been
found. This would lend more credibility to the parental rights
argument.
Conclusion
Every state has laws regarding visitation rights of third parties with
children. How constitutional are these laws? The best interest standard
is extremely fluid. It is often wrongly applied and misunderStood. There
are no set regulations for applying it. The best interest standard is used
when third parties wish to have visitation rights with a child against the
wishes of the child's parents. This negates the fundamental right of
parents to raise their child. It is appalling that there are states with
unconstitutional statutes regarding visitation . Legislators and politicians
should reexamine their state's statutes, making them constitutional.
The parental rights standard has a stronger constitutional basis and
historically has been upheld by the Supreme Court more frequently
than the best interest standard. Troxel v. Granville, consistent with the
constitutional guarantee, shows that the parental rights standard should
be the prevalent standard. Parents have a fundamental, constitutional
right to raise their children how they see fit. The only reason that
parents could lose that right is due to unfitness or a compelling state
interest-one that would withstand the strictest scrutiny of the
Supreme Court. The state cannot dictate to the parents how to raise
their children, nor allow others to do it for them.
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